

Lauerge

Doc. 2674 A

書類第二六七四Aの

秘 密

聯合軍編記通設部

南西太平洋地区

敵刊物

第三二号 一九四三年八月十一日(昭和十八年)

Ex 1343A

目次

蘭領印度作戦ニ就テ

一九四二年二月乃至三月

某陸軍中佐、蘭印作戦ニ関スル報告、發見未了中

大及毎日新聞ヨリ、臺灣ト戦ハル

(ポポリニトシタ 一九四二年十一月十日)

ハムニ ハフ ニハルニ大佐

通信隊聯絡長

No. 1

最後迄駐引

身はナル降服

午後四時戦いの進行場＝到着した。司令部、進行場、側＝
ア、司令部、一、部屋＝、蘭印、高級將校若干ト外＝
平服ヲ着ケルナ人位、人カ居、テ私ハ初メ此處＝總督
カ居タ、タト覺ツタ。向モナリ蘭印航空學校、某將校宅
テ敵總督並ニ部下ト令見ニタ。夫ハ綺麗ナ部屋ニアリ、
中央ニ長イ桌子カアリ。軍司令部、軍參謀長及リ透藤
／ENDO／部隊長、三人、將官カ左側、再ニシタ。ソノ後ニ
參謀將校カ着席ニタ。「スタルクベルグ」／STARKENBERG／
總督トソノ部下カ入リテキタ。軍司令部、同側ニ、總督、ハ、
左ニ「テルポータ」／TERPOOTEN／軍司令部、ハ、次ニ各參
謀將校カ居タ。ソノ後、各幕僚ト文官、ハ、後ニ立リテサ
リ。總督ト司令長官、ハ、程度、權限ヲ彼等カ有ニシ
イタカニ就テ命令サ／IMAMURA／司令部、認向テ受ケタ。
總督ハ不可思議ナコトヲハアルカ最高指揮、大權ヲ持
テイナト言フ。其カ、陸軍ト文官ハ蘭印總督、手中
ニアリタカ海軍、ハ、女王、直接總督下ニアリコトハ、間接
ナコトアル。其ハ、ソノ事件ヲ起シ「ウェーヴ」／WAVELL／、創
者ニタ時、責任回避ヲシタカ、知ラナリ。ソノ後再度軍
司令部カ貴下ハ、更條件降服ヲスルカト認メ、時總督、靜
ニ首ヲ振ツタ。次ニ總督ハ、發言ニタ「テ待シテ下サ、口、側
ニ報導員カ、電報班員カ居ル、ハ、ナリ、スナリ、ナリ進出、ハ、
下サ、」將軍ハ、認メタ「ソノナリ貴下ハ、何故来タカ總督ハ、言フ

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No. 5

昨九日、貴方ハ午後四時モラ一度此処ニ来リ我ガ軍ヲ要スル條件
 ニ就テ報告ヲシテ下サイト言ハル。然レ督司令官及ビ参謀將校ハ降服
 トイフコト嫌忌スベキ考ラ厭ガツテ降服條件全部ヲ完了シテ去レ
 特別ノ好意ヲ以テ彼等ハ且隱ミテ歩哨線ヲ通過スルコトヲ許可セルノ
 夕九日ノ午前十時三十分司令官長官司令部ノ「エニ意味明カナ
 デルモ斯ク譯ス」ニ於テ放送スルヲ聞イタ。彼等ハ震ヘテ居リ。彼ハ要求ガ
 不モリヨリモズト丁度ニ全軍ニ降服ヲ放送シタ。彼等ノ蘭印軍ハ不
 利ノ状況ニ在リテ違ナシ。夕方司令官長官司令部ニ通リヤテ来タ。
 軍司令官ハ更ニ「要ヲ出シタ。〇〇部隊長ハ先ヅ軍司令部ニ行キ
 ソレカラ司令官長官ト話シテテ。彼等ハ「バンドン」要塞入ルヲアル。九日夜、軍
 司令部ハ「バンドン」エヌ／＼國ノ村ニ露營シタ。三月十日ハ要塞ニ凱旋
 入城ヲ行時ト定メラレタ。軍参謀將校ト一緒ニ〇〇部隊長ノ司令部ニ
 行キ我々が「バンドン」ニ着イタ時ハモウ暗カッタ。ソノ晩邊、以前ノ「ネー
 マン・ホタル」HOMAN」ニ入リ、コハ私が二年前泊ワタコトアル「ホタル」デア
 ル。ジヤバ／＼JAYA／＼ハ遂ニ落ヤタ。困難ヲ作戦上陸後僅ニ週間デ
 見了シタ。コレハ計画ヨリモズト早カッタ。「ミンガホール」ノ陷落シタ。月十五
 日夜幸福感ニ浸リテカラ空ヲ見エテ南ナリテ見贖メタ。而テ「ブギテマ」
 BOEKITEMA HILLノ指揮所ニ是生ノ所デ聞イタ。數舞スル話ヲ志
 に出シ始メタ。ソノ夜、頗ニ涙ヲ流シ、心中ハ詩モナク歌モナク北ノ空ヲ眺
 ミテ居タ。拙イ詩句ハ心中ニ浮ンタ。私は一昨年始メテコノ島ヲ見テ而シテコノ
 同ジ部屋ニ泊ワタリテ夜ヲサヘモ。歌ノ一言モ私ハ心ヲ明ルクシナカッタ。
 最も感動ヲ受ケツツアル瞬間ニ於テサヘ涙モ流れ
 タ歌モ出ナカッタ。コレハ實際筆紙ニ盡シ難キ感慨デアル。

Da 2674-A...

證明書

余「ジエール・エー・ブランクシップ」Jewell A. Blankenship 中尉
記録情報、綴主佐将校、聯合軍部設通設部、敵出版物ヲ三
十二號、二部ヲ添付國際檢察部文書ヲニ六之五號が一九四三年昭和
十五年三月附一中佐、バートン・キ記、綴主佐中尉、聯合軍部設
通設部、堪能ナル綴訳者ヲ英設タル押收日本文書、英設タルコトヲ茲
ニ証明ス。

余、更ニ此日本語文書、原本が「ロニア」Washington D.C. 地事
盛頓市盛頓文書本部へ添附セラルタルモノナルコトヲ証明ス。

米兵中尉

「ジエール・エー・ブランクシップ」署名
Jewell A. Blankenship

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CONFIDENTIAL -- BRITISH SECRET

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

ENEMY PUBLICATIONS

No:
32

Date:
11 Aug '43

CONTENTS

ACCOUNT OF THE NETHERLANDS

EAST INDIES OPERATION

Feb - Mar '42

Handwritten loose sheets, containing an account of the E.E.I. Op as related by "a Lt-Col", apparently copied from the OSAKA MAINICHI.

(POPONDETTA - 19 Nov '42)

/s/ Sidney F. Mashbir

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR,
Colonel, S.C.,
Co-ordinator.

CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

BARGAINING UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT.Cowardly Surrender.

At 1600 hrs, we arrived at the aerodrome. HQ was at the side of the aerodrome. In one of the HQ rooms there were a number of high ranking DUTCH INDIES officers and also about 10 men wearing civilian clothes, so I realized for the first time that the Governor General was here. There was an interview with the enemy Governor General and his subordinates shortly afterwards in the house of a certain officer of the DUTCH INDIES Flying School. It was in a neat room. There was a long table in the centre. Three generals, the Army Comdr, the Army Chief of Staff and BUTAI Comdr ENDO were seated on the right. Behind these, sat the Staff Officers. Governor General STARKENBERG and his subordinates came in. Across from the Army Comdr was the Governor General, on the left of him was the Army Comdr in Chief TERPOORTEN, next were various Staff Officers, while the enemy staffs and civilian officials stood in the rear. The Governor General and Army Comdr in Chief were questioned by Comdr IMAMURA as to what power they possessed. Governor General stated that he does not have the prerogative of supreme command which was a very strange thing. It is a funny thing that from long ago, the military and civilian services were in the hands of the DUTCH INDIES Governor General yet only the Navy was under the direct control of the Queen. I don't know if it was the evading of the responsibility on the arrival of WAVELL that caused the trouble. And again when the Army Comdr asked, "Will you surrender unconditionally?" the Governor General was calm, shook his head. Then he said, "Just a moment, I don't know whether he is a reporter or a photographer by the door, so will you please have him removed." "In that case, why did you come?" asked the General. "You asked me, so I accepted your invitation and came. I was planning to discuss the matter with the JAVA Civil Administration," he retorted. Next he faced the Comdr in Chief of the Army and asked "Will you surrender unconditionally?" "Please only accept the surrender of BANDUNG." "The BANDUNG Area is not a problem as far as we are concerned." "The only problem is, are you willing to surrender unconditionally, or do you refuse to surrender the DUTCH INDIES?" He said, "I know very well that we are not an enemy of the JAPANESE Army." At that time the Governor General stared pointedly at the Comdr in Chief of the Army. No matter how many times he was questioned, he only mentioned the armistice of BANDUNG.

General IMAMURA solemnly said "There is no use for further questioning. If you don't surrender Unconditionally, there isn't any other way but to

attack

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attack continuously. Your comdres will return to BANDUNG immediately. You will be protected by our troops up to the sentry line, but if you step over the sentry line, we will attack BANDUNG with our aircraft which are on the aerodrome loaded with bombs. However, I will give you this last chance to consider. I will give you ten minutes from now to make the final decision," and so saying he arose. When the ten minutes time was up, IMANURA stood up and faced the Governor General. "We are not referring to the administration. You do not seem to have supreme authority, so henceforth I will prohibit you from speaking. I will speak only to the Comdr in Chief of the Army from now." Next the Comdr in Chief was asked to reply but the man responsible for the entire NEI Army withered and agreed to surrender the entire area. Governor General said "This is out of my jurisdiction so I shall leave," and so saying, he arose and left the room. At the entrance he again requested "Will you remove the photographer?" Although they are the enemy I cannot help but admire their attitude. Governor General Sheldon STARKENBERG is 54 this year, however, he appears as young as 44 or 45, being tall, medium built, manly and very handsome. He has resided here for 5½ years since he is lord of the EAST INDIES and 70,000,000 inhabitants in his forties so he is without a doubt one of the most capable men of HOLLAND. Although he was facing an impossible situation he maintained his dignity as a Governor General while knowing that he will not return alive if anything goes wrong and that the entire EAST INDIES area was defeated. His splendid attitude cannot be compared with that of PERCIVAL whom I saw in SINGAPORE. There is no race in the world that bargain as the DUTCH do. Even today, at this very moment they came to negotiate a bargain. In this manner they probably postered the economic mission of a year ago. This is unlike the time we were in SINGAPORE. The battlefield of the DUTCH INDIES extended east and west several thousands km. Although we ordered the forces in the entire area to cease fighting immediately we know that this cannot be transmitted easily. The Army HQ Comdr asked various questions in regard to surrendering to the Army Comdr. After obtaining the signature on this, he said, "The demands which I gave you, must be broadcast by the Comdr himself to the EAST INDIES forces of the entire EAST INDIES area tomorrow morning, the 9th. When that broadcast is heard in the east, you must confirm your bona fide surrender. Tomorrow, the 9th, you will come here again at 1600 hrs and will report on the conditions which our army demands." The Governor General, Comdr and his Staff Officers disliked this odious idea of surrendering but they completed all the items of surrendering and departed. They will receive special kindness by being permitted to pass through the sentry line without being blindfolded. At 1030 hrs on the 9th, I heard a broadcast made by the Army Comdr at the Army Comdr TAI. His voice shook. He broadcasted to his entire army the surrender in a much more civil way than the demands indicated. They must have been in a bad situation. In the evening the Comdr came as ordered.

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The Army Comdr made a further demand. The OO BUTAI Comdr first went to the Army HQ and then together with the Comdr in Chief, they will enter the fortress of BANDUNG. On the night of the 9th, Army HQ bivouacked in a village in the country N of BANDUNG. 10 March has been set as the time for making the triumphant entry into the fortress, so I journeyed with the Army Staff Officer to HQ of the OO BUTAI Comdr. It was dark when we arrived at BANDUNG. Late that night, I went into a room of the old HOMAN Hotel where I stayed over 2 years ago. JAVA finally fell. The difficult operation was completed only one week after the landing, which was much quicker than we had planned. On the night of 15 Feb, when SINGAPORE fell, I looked up at the Southern Cross happily and began to recollect the inspiring tale which was told at the command post lawn of BOKITEMA Hill. That night, by just looking at the northern skies with tears on my cheeks and without a poem or song in my mind a doggerel verse formed in my mind. Even on the same night as I first saw this island the year before last and stayed at the same room, not even a word of the song enlightened my mind. Tears did not flow or was there a song even in my most inspiring moments. This is really an indescribable feeling.

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DOCUMENT 2674A

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Jewell A. Blankenship, 1st Lt. OIC R&I Files -----
hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section
Document No. 2674, a portion of ATIS Enemy Publication No. 32,
being a translation of loose bound handwritten notes of a Lt. Col.
dated Feb and March 1942, is an English translation of a captured
Japanese document rendered into English by a competent ATIS
translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was
forwarded to the Washington Document Center, Washington, D.C.

/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship
1st Lt. Inf.

Ex. 1344

"Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War."

1. Prior to the outbreak of World War II various estimations were made by the Supreme Command and the government regarding the problem of political control and reversion of the southern occupied areas, including the Dutch Indies. From the outset, however, the Foreign Ministry had attached importance to the independence of the Dutch Indies.

Shortly before the start of landing operations in the Dutch Indies the General Headquarters of the Southern Army, in order to facilitate political administration after the operations and occupation, had given publicity to the independence for the Indonesian race by the use of the radio facilities in Saigon and Bangkok. At the same time, the Netherlands Government had sent back to Java, Soekarno and Hatta, both leaders of the Indonesian racial movement, who were then in exile, and had urged them to organize the Indonesian militia in resistance to the Japanese Army. As a reward for this, independence was to be granted to the East Indies area, but they seem to have both refused this proposal. After the occupation of the Dutch Indies by the Japanese Army, the army authorities on the spot allowed these racialists to take the lead, as in Burma and the Philippines, where independence was later declared, and invited them to establish the Java Public Service Association (the Java Hokokai), and other organizations for cooperation with the Japanese, among the native inhabitants. They pressed their administrative policies towards strengthening racialist tendencies. On the other hand, the General Headquarters of the Southern Army then in Singapore, maintained a policy of suppressing this tendency. The government at home, too, had no alternative but the extreme policy of bringing the Dutch Indies under Japan's direct control and checking the policy of racial liberation, in order to secure the resources necessary for the execution of the war. For this reason, the Supreme Command emphasized its strong opposition to the independence of the East Indies.

Consequently, the plan for the reversion of occupied areas, decided at the Liaison Conference of the government and Imperial Headquarters on 4 January 1943, stipulated independence only for Burma and the Philippines, and mentioned that independence for other areas would be decided later. Then, at the Imperial Conference of 31 May 1943, it was decided to make it their policy to incorporate the East Indies areas into Japanese territory, and to allow the participation in politics of native inhabitants according to their abilities.

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It was also decided not to announce this reversion plan so that the Allied Powers might not take advantage of it for propaganda purposes.

At the time of this decision Prime Minister Tojo was rather in favour of independence and the Foreign Ministry also supported the plan, but the Supreme Command maintained strong opposition, as mentioned above; while others again, took the stand that once independence was granted, Japan, for the sake of her personal honour would have to respect the independence to the last, and would be in a difficult position when negotiations, peace, etc., came one day to be considered, and that for this reason the status quo should be maintained. Territorial incorporation was thus finally decided on.

2. Though the Japanese Army authorities on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this decision, they made no representations of their opposition. Mr. Soekarno, who visited Japan soon after the Greater East Asia Conference, made an earnest request to Prime Minister Tojo to grant the East Indies area her independence. The meeting, however, ended without any definite reply from Tojo and Soekarno returned to Java greatly disappointed.

Hayashi, Chief of the Justice Administration,

Later, who was then Supreme Councillor for the Military Administration in Java, came to Tokyo, by approval of the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army on the spot, with the problem of independence for the East Indies, and did his utmost to get it accepted by the circles concerned. Foreign Minister Shigenitsu supported the proposal and made efforts for the alteration of the decision mentioned above. With the formation of the Koiso Cabinet, the arguments for independence gradually began to carry more weight.

For instance, at the first War Supervision Conference of the Koiso Cabinet, it was decided, in an article of "The Policies to be Taken in the Future for the Supervision of the War", that a statement concerning independence for the East Indies should be declared at the next Diet Session. As for the circumstances which had led to this decision, the Mariana defense line on the Pacific front had been broken and the United States was rapidly turning to the offensive. The situation was such that the new Cabinet had to take some new measures for uniting Greater East Asia, and it was only natural that the Foreign Ministry should insist upon the plan for independence. The central authorities of the army now also inclined to approve of this plan in compliance to the requests from the army authorities on the spot, for the reason that racial consciousness had been so noticeably enhanced in Java and Sumatra, the areas under Army Military Administration, that thanks to

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The naval authorities, however, still maintained such strong opposition, that the promotion of the independence policy was entirely deferred as far as the areas under the Navy's Military Administration were concerned. (Annex I).

For this reason, no definite policy was decided in regard to independence, except that Prime Minister Koiso merely made a statement at the Diet Session to the effect that the independence for the East Indies area would be considered in the future. (Annex II).

3. Subsequently, the war situation took a turn for the worse and sea-transportation between Japan and the South was definitely at an end. For this reason, demands for economic self-sufficiency by the troops on the spot were greatly increased, and it became notably difficult to win the hearts of the native inhabitants of Java and Sumatra by mere abstract statements about independence.

The army authorities on the spot had previously established a Central Advisory Council in Java, in accordance with the policy of political participation for the native inhabitants, but this was no more than a consultative body for political administration. The deciding of a definite policy for the preparation of independence thus became an imminent problem.

The navy, on the other hand, no longer had any further reason to adhere to its past opposition views, as the abandonment of the South had already been taking place since the fall of the Philippines.

Since the beginning of 1945, the opinions of the army and the navy had become uniform over the problem of independence for the East Indies, and other matters.

Consequently, after the following discussion was held by the authorities concerned of the three Ministries at the Supreme Advisory Conference of July 17th, it was decided that, "The Empire shall recognize the independence of the East Indies at the earliest possible opportunity. For this purpose, preparations for independence shall be immediately promoted and intensified." (Annex III) and (Annex IV).

Less than a month later the Empire had surrendered and this was never put into effect.

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Doc. No. 2754

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Identification

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the capacity of Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official on November 14, 1946, I executed certificates of source and authenticity with respect to I.P.S. documents Nos. 2754 (entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War"), 2755 (entitled "Matters Pertaining to the Measures for the Independence of the N.E.I., Proposed by Members of the Various Ministries Concerned"), 2758 (entitled "Measures for the N.E.I. Independence, Data for Foreign Minister's Explanation, 17 July, 1945") and 2759 (entitled "Supreme War Directive Council Decision No. 27, 17 July 1945, Matters Concerning Steps for E.I. Independence").

I further certify, that I.P.S. documents Nos. 2755, 2758 and 2759 are the annexes, respectively I, III and IV, referred to in I.P.S. document 2754.

Signed at Tokyo
on this 3rd day of December 1946

Signed: K. Hayashi

Foreign Office
Japanese Government

Witness: /s/ Nagahara Odo (SEAL)

Statement of Official Procurement:

I, Richard F. Lersh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3 day of December 1946

Signed: Richard F. Lersh
Investigator I.P.S.

Witness: /s/ Wm. C. Prout

1.

EX 1344

Doc 2754

第二次世界大戦中ニ於ケル東印度ノ統治及
歸屬決定ニ關スル経緯

一、第二次世界大戦勃發前蘭印ヲ含ム南方占領地
域ノ統治歸屬ノ問題ハ統帥部及政府内部ニ於
テ種々研究サルルトコロアリタルモ外務省ハ
當初ヨリ蘭印獨立ヲ重々視セリ蘭印上陸作戰
開始直前南方軍總司令部ハ作戰及占領後ノ施
政ヲ容易ナラシメンガ爲「サイゴン」及「バ
ンコック」ノ「ラジオ」ヲ利用シ「インドネ
シア」民族自立ノ宣傳ヲ行ヒタルガ同時期ニ
於テ、和蘭ハ流刑中ナリシ「インドネシア」
民族運動指導者「スカル」及「ヘツタ」ノ兩
氏ヲ「ジャバ」ヘ送還シ右ニ對シテ「インド
ネシア」國民軍ヲ組織シテ日本軍ニ抵抗スヘ
キコトヲ慫慂シ其代償トシテ東印度地域ニ獨
立ヲ許容スヘシトナシタルモ兩氏ハ之ヲ拒絕
セル経緯アリタルモノノ如シ日本軍ノ蘭印占
領後現地軍當局ハ後ニ獨立聲明ノ行ハレタル
「ビルマ」「フィリピン」ニ於ケルト同様之
等民族主義者ヲ先頭ニ立テ「ジャワ」奉公會
其他現住民ノ對日協力組織ヲ設立セシムルト
共ニ民族主義的傾向ヲ強化スルカ如キ方向ヘ

2.

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施政ヲ押進スルトコロアリタルガ當時「シン
ガポール」ニ在リタル南方軍總司令部ハ逆ニ
之ニ抑壓セントスルノ方針ヲ持シ中央ニ於テ
モ亦戰爭遂行ノ爲ノ資源獲得ニハ之ヲ直轄領
トシテ徹底セル政策ヲ採用スルノ外ナク獨立
許容等ノ民族解放政策ハ之ヲ阻害スヘシトノ
理由ニテ統帥部ハ東印度獨立ニ強硬ナル反對
ヲ主張セリ其結果昭和十八年一月四日大本營
政府連絡會議決定占領地歸屬腹案ハ「ビルマ」
「フィリッピン」ノミノ獨立ヲ規定シ其他ニ
關シテハ追テ定ムトナシタルガ次テ同年五月
三十一日御前會議決定ハ東印度地域ヲ帝國領
土ヘ編入スヘキコトヲ決定シ現住民ノ民度ニ
應シ政治參與ヲ認ムルカ如キ方策ヲ取ルト共
ニ聯合國側宣傳ニ乗セラレザル様本歸屬決定
ヲ發表セザル事トセリ。本決定ニ際シ東條總
理大臣ハ寧ロ獨立論ニ傾キ居リ外務省又獨立
案ヲ主張セルガ統帥部ハ前述ノ如ク強硬ナル
反對論ヲ持シ又一部ニハ一度獨立ヲ許容セバ
帝國トシテハ信義トシテ敢ク迄之ヲ尊重セザ
ルヲ得ズ將來交渉平和等考慮サルル場合困難
ナル地位ニ立ツヘキヲ以テ現狀ノ儘ヲ可トス

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3.

ヘシトノ見解モアリテ遂ニ領土遷入ノ決定ヲ
見タル次第ナリ

二、本決定ニ對シ現地軍當局ハ頗ル不満ナリシモ
積極的ニ反對意見ヲ具申スルニ至ラズ又大東
亞會議直後來訪セル「スカルノ」氏ハ東條總
理大臣ニ對シ東印度地域ニ對スル獨立許容ヲ
懇請セルモ東條總理大臣ハ何等確答ヲ與フル
コトナクシテ會見ヲ終リタルヲ以テ「スカル
ノ」氏ハ多大ノ失望ヲ拘キ「ジャバ」へ歸還
セリ其後「ジャバ」軍政最高顧問タリシ林司
政長官ハ現地軍最高指揮官トノ諒解ノ下ニ上
京シ東印度獨立論ヲ持シテ關係方面ノ説得ニ
努ムルトコロアリ重光外務大臣ハ之ヲ支持シ
テ前記決定變更ノ努力ヲナシタルガ小磯內閣
成立ト共ニ東印度獨立論ハ漸有力化スルニ至
レリ

即小磯內閣最初ノ戰爭指導會議ニ於テ「今後
採ルヘキ戰爭指導ノ方策」中ノ一項ニ於テ次
期議會ニ於テ東印度獨立ニ關スル聲明ヲナス
コトニ決定ヲ見ルカ其ノ經緯ヲ見ルニ當時太
平洋正面ニ於テハ「マリヤナ」ノ防禦線崩壞
シテ米國ノ攻勢急速化シツツアリタル際ニシ
テ新內閣トシテハ大東亞結集上何等カ新ナル

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三、

政略上ノ手ヲ打タサルヲ得ザル情勢ニアリタル次第ニシテ外務省カ獨立論ヲ主張セルハ云フ迄モナキトコロナルカ陸軍中央モ亦陸軍軍政地域タリシ「ジャバ」「スマトラ」ニ於ケル民族意識ノ昂揚著シキモノアリ獨立問題ヲ不明確ナル情態ニ放置シツツ原住民ノ協力ヲ確保スルコト漸時困難トナリ居ルヲ以テ現地軍當局ノ要請ヲ容レ獨立論ニ贊意ヲ表スルニ至レリ。然レ共海軍側ハ依然トシテ強硬ナル反對意見ヲ持シ獨立施策ノ押進ニ對シ海軍軍政地域ニ關スル限り全面的留保ヲナシタルヲ以テ（附屬一）單ニ議會ニ於テ小磯內閣總理大臣ヨリ將來東印度地域ノ獨立ニ關シ支援ヲナスヘキ旨ノ聲明行ハレタルニ止リ（附屬二）獨立ニ關スル何等具體の方策ノ決定ヲ見ルニ至ラス

其後戰局ハ更ニ惡化シ南方地域トノ海上交通ハ事實上杜絶情態トナリタルヲ以テ現地ニ於ケル軍自活ノ爲ノ經濟的要求ハ増大シ「ジャバ」「スマトラ」ニ於テハ抽象的ナル獨立聲明ノミヲ以テシテハ原住民ノ人心把握ハ著シク困難トナレリ現地軍當局ハ義ニ原住民政治參與ノ方針ニ基キ「ジャバ」ニ中央參議院ヲ設置

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セルモ右ハ單ナル施政ニ對スル諮問機關タル
ニ過キザリシヲ以テ獨立準備ノ爲ノ具體的方
策ノ決定ハ焦眉ノ問題トナレリ
他方海軍側モ「フイリピン」失陷後ハ南方放
棄ハ既ニ現實化シ來リタルヲ以テ從來ノ反對
論ヲ固持スルノ理由ヲ喪失シ昭和二十年初頭
ヨリ東印度獨立問題ニ關スル外陸海ノ主張ハ
漸次統一セラルルニ至レリ依テ三省關係官ノ
間ニ付次ノ討議ヲ經タル結果七月十七日最高
指導會議ニ於テ「帝國ハ可及的速カニ東印度
ノ獨立ヲ容認ス之ヲ爲直チニ獨立準備ヲ促進
強化スルモノトス」トノ決定ヲ見タルモ（附
屬三）及（附屬四）其後一ヶ月弱ニシテ帝國
ノ降伏トナリタルヲ以テ之カ實施ヲ見スシテ
終レリ

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證明書
認定證明

余林馨、余不記、資格於、日本外務省、文書課、長、上、日、本、政府、上、公、關、係、在、美、士、上、
並、余、該、官、長、上、國、際、機、關、文、書、課、長、上、日、本、政府、上、公、關、係、在、美、士、上、
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（重、重、解、開、野、上、日、本、政府、上、公、關、係、在、美、士、上、）
茲、據、名、上、國、際、機、關、文、書、課、長、上、日、本、政府、上、公、關、係、在、美、士、上、
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茲、據、名、上、國、際、機、關、文、書、課、長、上、日、本、政府、上、公、關、係、在、美、士、上、

一九百零六年 昭和三年 十月三日

東京 於 署 官 名

日本外務省 林 馨 署 官 名
證 人 長 春 署 官 名 捺 印

治安 閣 入 證明

余、名、上、日、本、政府、上、公、關、係、在、美、士、上、
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東京 於 署 官 名

國際機務部 署 官 名
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